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ADDRESS BY VADM STANSFIELD TURNER, USN

to the

WINTER MEETING

NAVY LEAGUE NATIONAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS

at

Phoenix, Arizona

on

2 December, 1972

INTRODUCTION

Thomas E. Morris, National President

Navy League of the United States

. . . . public has been very substantial; the reason, is its new President, Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner. Because of what he is seeking to accomplish and because also of the impact on his students, and eventually the Navy Leadership, I've asked him to come to address us here today.

Since our mission is to support the Maritime Forces, I think it only prudent that we acquaint ourselves with the new leadership of the Navy and also with the direction the Navy is moving today.

Stan Turner is a displaced native of Highland Park, Illinois. He was graduated from the Naval Academy in 1946, and after a year at sea was appointed a Rhodes Scholar, and entered Oxford University in 1947. This is where his studies in Political Science led to a Master's Degree. From the campus he went to sea in Destroyers for six years. He gained his first Command, the oceangoing Minesweep, CONQUEST, in 1956; then a tour ashore, then two more at sea before being assigned Secretary of Defense McNamara's much-touted--and in some instances, much maligned--Office of Systems Analysis. Amen.

After this stint ashore, he went back to sea by way of Harvard University's Advanced and Managers' Program, and commanded the DLG, HORNE. And this saw service with the Task Force 77 in Vietnam. Then came two years as Assistant--

Executive Assistant--to the Secretary of the Navy, and in 1970, promotion to Rear Admiral. After serving as Commander, Cruiser/Destroyer Flotilla EIGHT, he came back to Washington as Director of the Systems Analysis Division at OPNAV. (I guess he straightened it out.) He assumed his present duties this summer. And this is the first time we've had the pleasure of having him with our group to talk to us about what he is doing at the Naval War College. And I also--it's not written here, but I understand he was among our distinguished people who became thirty-nine yesterday! Ladies and gentlemen, the President of the Naval War College, Vice Admiral Stan Turner.

Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner speaks:

Ladies and Gentlemen; Tom, thank you very much; not just for the generous introduction, even if you have to keep reminding people I'm tired of being a Systems Analyst. But thank you for inviting me to be here with you today. I certainly always enjoy my opportunities to get together with Navy League groups, but I think this is a particular privilege to be here with the real Leadership, the real decision makers of the Navy League; and to be able to share some thoughts with you. And I'd like to start by expressing not only my general gratitude to the Navy League for the support that we all so generously have received from you, but in particular, for the support we've had at the Naval War College in just the most recent weeks.

As you may know, we have two very interesting programs at the War College, where we have International Officers who come for a course of study from all over the world. -In one of those courses there are thirty-one countries represented. And part of their normal program is to take about three field trips around United States. We want them to see more than Newport, meet more people than the friends they have there; to find out what our country's like; to see its principal cities; visit its manufacturing establishments, businesses, and military installations. But it occurred to me that in trying to give these people a real impression of America,

what kind of people we generally are, because I think that's most important, because I have a firm conviction that when people come to know us as individuals, they come to understand and respect America. I asked Tom Morris if he could give me some help on this and proposed that we try this year, not only to send them on these tours, not only to have them visit with people that are at cocktail parties, and go to people's homes for dinner, but to go and live in American homes, to actually take up residence with one of our families, and see what our day-to-day life is like, and what kind of people we generally are.

And Tom was most generous, in working through the Chicago Council with Warren Pursell, Lew Taylor, Bill Loarie, and Gordon . Just three weeks ago they set up opportunities for all thirty-one of these students to spend the better part of a weekend in an American home; each student to a separate home ranging from Hammond, Illinois around the Indiana, to Barrington, Illinois. And those boys came back from this aboard ship, so charged up, so thrilled at that opportunity; and they really enjoyed it; and I think they came away with a lasting impression that will do us in the Navy and in the United States, a great deal of good over the years to come. I'm grateful, but I'm mainly grateful, Tom, that we can turn to you and ask for this kind of support, and it's always forthcoming. I know that these foreign students are going to ask for the same kind of opportunity, not only again for this Class, but for continuing classes to come. And we're very, very appreciative.

Well, I've jumped ahead of myself now, because the thing I'd like to talk to you about today is higher education in the Navy, of which this International Course is just one part. Obviously this kind of education would be of interest to me, having turned Professor five months ago after having been out of the Academic World for many years. I find it a fascinating opportunity. But I think it's also of interest to all of you, because in my opinion, we can clearly demonstrate that there is a greater need today in your Navy, for people who are real thinkers, people who have been given an opportunity for a meaningful higher education, than there has been ever before in the history of the Navy.

All we have to do, for instance, is look at the world around us. It seems to me that in this particular period of 1972, we're beginning after twenty-seven years, to wind down, to close out, World War II. The Cold War followed so closely on the end of World War II that we never were able to establish some normal relations, or to set up what might be called a status quo. And only now with the dramatic events of the past year or so that you're all familiar with, the opening to China; the effort to bring her back into the Community of Nations; the President's trip to Moscow; the arrangement of a treaty that will normalize the frontiers between the two Germanys; and today, the dramatic things that are going on at this very moment; the people who are meeting in Vienna right now, on the second phase of the SALT negotiations; the people who are

meeting in Helsinki right now, on the preliminaries for a thirty-some nation conference on European Security that will follow not long from now; the people who are about to meet, probably in Geneva on the first round of what is going to be known as The Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Europe. All of these efforts are efforts to wind down World War II; to cool off the pressures in the world and to establish more permanent and workable relationships in the International Community.

And with this, we have a great many hopes. We have people who hope that we're not going to need any military force in the future. We have people asking why, with this pressing domestic need, should we spend so much money on military forces. And we can no longer simply go back to them and say, "We're geared to contain Communism."

And we must develop Naval Officers who can think through the problems of strategy deeply and sincerely, who can come up with meaningful and convincing answers to these questions that we're being asked every day; people who can see how the Navy should adjust to this new era of International Relations; who will forge the Navy in the image of tomorrow, not of yesterday.

And at the same time I think we need to develop Naval Officers who are practical and capable of understanding the youth of today and their new attitudes in this country. After all, youth are the lifeblood of the military. Without young men and young women, we're not going to have a Navy in the future.

And I would suggest that that's why, under the dynamic leadership of Admiral Zumwalt, we are dramatically adapting the Navy to the times. We have to learn to cast off those shackles of tradition which are not necessary to discipline and efficiency. In some quarters this is misunderstood as a passport to, or a policy of, permissiveness. I assure you it is not this. What it is, is looking at youth today and trying to understand what will attract, will motivate them, and will retain capable and fine young people in our military service.

→ I would suggest today a new sort of deal with qualities in different proportion, perhaps, than when you and I were young. And we must take these different qualities into consideration. For instance, I think the young people in this country feel at least that they are much more idealistic than we were. This is perhaps born of the affluence of our society. But one way or another, I think that they are more particular about the jobs they take. They want jobs that have respect and a sense of purpose. And it is up to us to respond, assure them and convince them that the jobs that they would have in the Navy are in fact, jobs with respect and a real purpose in life.

And I would suggest that this is the impulse behind that famous Z-Gram which will in time do away with the wonderful bell-bottom trousers and white hats of our sailors. That's a uniform that you and I are very nostalgic about. It has great symbolism of a man at sea. But we have found that this does not conjure up respect from the young people of this country,

and we have thereby discarded it and are moving to something which will make them feel as though they are in a respectful and important profession.

It's why we've had a Z-Gram that's done away with a lot of what we call "demeaning" regulations-- The little things that bother people, like when a man goes on leave he used to have to present actual evidence that he had enough money to come back. Well, today we're putting that responsibility on the man. We're trusting and respecting him.

(You know, there are a lot of people, Tom, who have come in late, and I wonder if we couldn't give them a chance to get a seat here. After all, if I'm going to talk for two hours, I'd like to . . . [much laughter here].

Another characteristic of our young people today that I think is very evident is, they are [words obliterated by thumping sound] . . . and individual. They want to be individual; they want to maintain their individuality even though they are in a military uniform. And that's why we've had a Z-Gram which says, when you go ashore from your ship, you can wear civilian clothes. You can blend with the community better.

And that's why we've had the most famous, of course, and the most controversial perhaps, of all the Z-Grams, the one on the beards and the hair. And I would suggest that while again, this is the doing away with the traditional uniform, it's a different ending to the tale--one that doesn't

appeal to you and me right off the bat. But then I think if you think about it, and if you look back at pictures of Admiral Dewey, or even Admiral Farragut and people like that, they not only had the long hair and the sideburns, the beards, and the muttonchops, but they were much more hirsute than any of the sailors that you see today. They were gracious and capable fighting men. And we can do it too.

Still another characteristic of the young people today is they really are more intelligent. They've had a better education and they're coming up and joining the Navy. They discern what are "Mickey Mouse" rules and regulations, what is "make-work." They discern when we are really interested in them, and when we're just being superficial. And this, I think, is the genesis behind Z-Grams on things like Sponsors. Today when a man is transferred with his family from one station to another, we're playing the Sponsor to this station. We write to him, telling him what's what, helping him make his arrangements, so that moving with his family is not as traumatic an experience as it is for us and for them sometimes.

We finally have a Z-Gram that says, "Look, let's minimize the number of sailors who stay on board ship on watch when it's in port. We can't get down below minimum security. We must be able to do our job, but let's not have anybody staying on board who doesn't really feel and understand that he has an important function before him; not because we have one-in-three as the standard "one sailor on board for every three on the ship,

is really necessary to do our job.

And it's why we've had what I've found one of the most thrilling things in one of the Z-Grams; and that's the Dependents' Air Charter Program. I happen to have been overseas as part of the first one. When a ship or group of ships goes overseas for the expected eight-month deployment, about midway we charter an airplane at no expense to the Government, that the boys pay for, and they send a whole group of dependents over to a foreign port. And then they return with a group of sailors who'd rather spend that time at home. Two weeks later, the plane reverses itself and brings the sailors back to the ship and sends the Dependents back home again. This not only breaks up the monotony, the separation of a long deployment; it not only lets the Dependents see the world as sailors do; but I think the important part is it makes that wife and that family a part of that husband's experience. They begin to understand why he's gone on these deployments, what he's doing, and how important it is to his country.

And I would suggest to you that there is nothing ridiculous in these types of changes that we're making in your Navy; and I would deny the statement of the retired Rear Admiral on the TV, recently, when he said, "Where are those clean-cut sailors" that he used to know in his day? My answer to him is, "Where, where are those clean-cut High School boys and College boys that there used to be in your day and mine?"

The Navy moves like an automobile. It's powered by manpower, while an automobile is powered by gasoline. When you change the quality of gasoline in your car, you adjust the carburetor and the distributor and the sparkplugs. And today we have a different kind of power, a different kind of manpower, coming into your Navy, and we must make these adjustments. And it's a serious business. And this is a talk to you about the problems of going to the All-Volunteer Force. If we don't adapt and attract these young people, we simply will not have a Navy.

So we're not changing for the sake of change. We're changing in my opinion, because we are fortunate in having a leader, Admiral Zumwalt, who is sensitive to current needs and trends, who is adapting the Navy to the world around us, so that we can maintain the Navy that is essential to our future. And that means developing Officers through our Naval educational system, who on the one hand, can be practical and capable of handling these terribly complex problems of International Relations; and on the other hand, can understand how to motivate the youth of our modern society.

And I think that this means that there's not only a greater intellectual requirement or demand upon the Officers of today's Navy, but it's a different one. And accordingly, we are trying to adapt the highest military educational system in the Navy to these changes of the times.

Specifically, most of the Naval Officer's educational experience and training inculcates in him normally a view

of a very rational, Newtonian universe, one in which there are precise, right and wrong answers that can be derived from almost every problem. For instance, in our vocational experience, we're used to an authoritarian chain of command. We recognize that the obligations of responsibility and authority, or if you can answer, to be trained to be able to make decisions, and to make them quickly. And we live with a technical environment, one in which there are answers that are generally right or wrong. In our educational experience, Annapolis is very largely an engineering school. And at the Postgraduate School in Monterey, we concentrate on the Physical Sciences. And in our training, out in the Fleet we stress particular skills that we must practice and do; and we do them one way, the right way, not the wrong way.

Now I'm not criticizing this, not in the least. We are a very technical Service in the Navy, and the prime ingredient of a successful Navy is technical, professional competence. We must have this. And our educational and training system in the Navy does an outstanding job in this regard.

But what I am suggesting is that Officers won't, as Officers, move up the ladder. They must be able to deal increasingly with situations like Strategy and Personnel Management, that are not simple and direct, or susceptible to precise right or wrong answers. And my job at the Naval War College is how to educate people to deal with such issues; and how to get Officers to recognize the subtleties, the uncertainties, the inexactness of the decision process of being a Senior Naval Officer.

Now in the Naval War College under the new curriculum that Tom has mentioned, we're trying to do this in a number of different ways. Let's start with how we approach this question of strategy, these issues of, Where does the Navy fit in in the (word obliterated by heavy thumping sound) era?

We're attempting to get to Strategy in our curriculum by using the device of Military History. We're trying to get the students to dissect the decisions of strategists of the past to see where this leads us. For instance we started this year--and it was something of a shock to the students, I must admit--by reading Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian Wars. Now this was twenty-five hundred years ago, and many of the students said, "How in the world is that relevant to what I'm doing in the last part of the twentieth century?"

Well, supposing that the war between Athens and Sparta was a war between a Seapower and a Landpower; that the Peloponnesian War was one in which the Seapower, Athens, decided to send an expedition across the seas as far away as Sicily. And they became overextended; they became bogged down. And the people of Athens gave up their support as to what was going on over there.

The analogies to this are obvious. And so we tried it. Having the Officers look at the things, the factors that influenced the decisions of the Athenians and the Spartans, makes them realize that the issues of whether to send a campaign overseas, whether to have a Maritime and a Sea Strategy or a Land Strategy, are

issues that people have grappled with for many many years. And they're issues that are not easily resolved, but the fundamental principles have not changed all that much, over these years.

Then we looked at other cases of Military History: the Napoleonic Wars, and how the Coalitions between all those countries on either side were formed; and how they affected the Strategy. We looked at our Civil War--not for the Land Campaign battles and tactics-- but because by then Lincoln had problems with his Generals, and this epitomized of civil/military relations.

We looked at the Spanish-American War. We've asked the question, "Were we imperialistic in 1898? Have we been imperialistic since then?"

We don't feel that History is going to repeat itself. But we do feel that today's Officers must be able to cope with these principles; and be able to answer questions like, "Who are our allies going to be in another generation?" After all, if we look back only twenty-five years, two of our principal allies today were our staunchest enemies. They'll have to answer questions like, "What does it mean if today we are moving into what's called a 'multipolar' world?" We've spent most of our lives, when you and I have been thinking of the problems of Strategy and International Relations in an era when there were two Powers that dominated the scene, ourselves and Russia. But if we look all the way back to Thucydides, when Athens and Sparta did dominate the world, there aren't many other instances when we were in what is known as a bipolar situation. The

situation that you and I have known as normal for the last twenty-five years is in fact, an aberration on history. And we want the students to feel and to understand this, and to be able to ask themselves the question, "Where in this kind of a complex situation, do we fit the United States and the United States' thinking?"

In truth, there are no precise, no easy answers to questions like this. And therefore, what we are trying to do in higher military education in the Navy today is to give students, late-career students, who are emerging into this world of the Social Sciences from the precise world of the Technical Sciences, give them an experience in intense thinking, in reasoning and logic and familiarity with the historical perspective.

We are emphasizing the thinking process, not the factual approach. How do we do this? We do it primarily by making the student think it out for himself. Let him do his own thinking. But though our course at the Naval War College this year was a very meaty one for anybody, he was only required to be on the campus five hours a week. He had two required Lectures and a three-hour Seminar. Now the rest of the time he wasn't exactly goofing off, because we gave him a thousand pages to study, reading and Military History to do. And every third week we required ^{him} to write an essay. What we were trying to do, though, was to give him enough latitude to explore the many facets of these particular problems; to look at all the various issues that impinged on the decisions of military leaders in the past.

We wanted him to be forced to do the digging out in the historical instance as in the future he's going to have to dig out what is applicable from his knowledge of International Relations and Political Science and Strategy and International Law, and so forth, what is applicable to the case in Military History that he's dealing with in 1973 or 1975. And the facts that are relevant to our Strategy today are not likely to be relevant four, five, ten years from now. But the principles, the process of thinking and reasoning is, and that's what we're trying to get across to our students.

I don't want to suggest that Strategy is the only thing we're trying to teach. We feel that Naval Officers today, more than ever before, are involved in what we call the Management Process. They're faced with some tough decisions, because we never have and never will have as much money to go around as we'd like to have. So they're faced with things like: if you had a billion dollars, would you spend it on four nuclear-powered Guided Missile Frigates or twenty Destroyer-Escorts? Now we all prefer the Nuclear Frigates, and there's some situations where we absolutely can't do with less. Nothing else would survive. There are other situations, however, where four or five of those Frigates just wouldn't go around far enough. We've got ten or twenty places to do a job. Obviously we're going to end up with some mix of this kind of thing; some number, maybe two Frigates and ten DE's; or one Frigate and fifteen DE's. How do we decide on that mix?

How do we settle on it? It's a very difficult situation. And here, again, it is not as precise as solving technical problems like, how do you put a missile together? or, how do you run the Engineering Plant of a Destroyer?

We're teaching the students to approach these massive problems by first looking at, "What is the objective? Why do you want a Frigate; why do you want a Destroyer Escort?" And this is a very imprecise thing; and it's done much as we do our Strategy--looking at the broad things that we're trying to achieve and making a judgment as to what our objective should be. And we're trying to make them appreciate that that's an important, but not a precise step that they have taken.

And then we go on to this very controversial field of Analysis and Systems Analysis. And we say that having established an objective, you can use relative tests, analytic techniques, to help you to make your choices, between the DE's and the Frigates or whatever it may be. But then, we cautioned them and recognized that in the long run, having made the very best decision in the world, if you can't get the Congress to buy it, you haven't done a thing! If you can't get your own bureaucracy in the Navy or in the Department of Defense to support it and carry it out, you haven't done a thing with all that fine analysis. And if you can't get Industry to build it for you at something like the cost that you estimated, you haven't done a thing. And how you get a decision executed, is again, a very imprecise thing. It's a matter of judgment; a matter of

feeling for public opinion; feeling for the state of industry and their attitudes; feeling for the attitudes and rigidities within your own bureaucracy.

So here again, the Management feels, what we're trying to do in higher Naval education today, is make the Officer understand that he must combine these techniques of (words obliterated by thumping sound) of the Sciences, that he's entrusted to the Universe, and the infiltration, of course, of Social Sciences.

And finally, the last part of our curriculum at the War College concerns what we call Tactics. We feel that with the size of the Military Establishment we're keeping today, we must be able to do more and get more from everything that we have. We must be able to employ tactically in a better way.

Here, concerning Tactics, the methodology of the scientific approach is very much with us. After all, in any tactical interaction, there are mathematical estimations that can be made. A Radar has a certain range, a certain probability of detection. You have certain errors that you can expect. And you can work out quite precisely what to expect under certain circumstances.

There is a hitch of course. Sometimes we don't really know what numbers to put in these mathematical equations. We don't know what the weather's going to be like tomorrow afternoon; and we're not even sure when the weather's bad or good, just exactly what effect this has on the Radar. We're not too sure whether the Radarman is going to be hung over

tomorrow morning 'cause he didn't get enough sleep, or whether he's going to be highly motivated because he's scared to death to know that (words obliterated by same loud thumping noise noted previously) his antenna.

So, we're trying to teach these Officers that here again, they must combine the techniques of perfecting calculations with analysis. These issues are definite with uncertainties. They must be willing and able to make their own estimates of how Radarman is going to perform tomorrow, and combine that with a price calculation on the characteristics and the frequencies and the range and the details of the Radar.

So the fourth part this year is systematic. But it ends up with probabilities, rather than preciseness. There's a probability that under Circumstance A you'll do well; there's a probability that under Circumstance B you'll do poorly. You, the Tactical Commander, must use two exceptions and decide how you're going to play your forces in any given situation.

So here again, the essence of what we are trying to achieve is to make these Senior Officers understand that they must deal with an area of less preciseness, and combine it, work with this, with the technical approach that they're so accustomed to.

Now this process of having to develop leaders, and this in turn, developing swift-moving Strategy from a combination of precise analysis and management along with the use of judgment to establish objectives and determine how to achieve those decisions that you make. An Officer should learn to deal with

the probabilities of Tactics. This demand upon us today means several things.

First, it means that while we must always be sure to be emphasizing the production of Officers who are technically competent in their profession, we must also ask then, good thinking, good reasoning, this analytical process that I've been emphasizing to you this morning. That's exactly why we have turned the curriculum at the Naval War College in a different direction.

Then, secondly, these demands on us also mean that we must in our recruiting, be able to attract into the Navy our share of the brightest young men in this country. And again, under the All-Volunteer Force, I can not stress too much that we must do everything we can to make the Navy attractive; and here I must plead your help; not for making it attractive from the inside, but for making--or inducing--the youth of this country to understand that despite what many of their friends and contemporaries are saying, that a military career isn't that an honorable career, an important career, and one essential to our country: I would suggest, though, that the fact that a military profession is becoming a more intellectually demanding one, is going to help us in this regard. Because when we add to the traditional appeal of a military career the fact that we're going to be doing less marching in lockstep to established doctrine, and that we're going to have much greater scope for individual initiative and thinking, I believe that we will

Closing remarks of Chairman (National President, Thomas E. Morris)

Thank you, Professor Stan. I think you advanced us very rapidly through your role as a Professor, the way you handled with such great finesse the seating of our latecomers. Stan, if you'll stand up there, please, I'd like to present to you the Navy League Cup. And may your Cup runneth over at the War College

NAVY LEAGUE PHOENIX ADDRESS

THANKS TOM MORRIS

ALWAYS ENJOY

PRIVILEGE ADDRESS LEADERSHIP AND DECISION MAKERS

NOT BELABOR GRATITUDE

NCC EXPERIENCE CHICAGO

ORLANDO

LOOK ON THIS - LESS AN ADDRESS - INFORMAL REPORT AND DISCUSSION

SUBJECT - *BEGUN ON WHAT WANT TALK*

STATE HIGHER MILITARY EDUCATION

OBVIOUSLY INTEREST TO ME

WHY TO YOU?

DEMONSTRABLE NAVY MORE DEPENDENT

REAL THINKERS

LOOK WORLD OUTSIDE US -

27 YEARS PROCESS WINDING DOWN WORLD WAR II

COLD WAR PROLONGATION WORLD WAR II

OVER

PREVENTED NORMALIZATION

STATUS QUO

LOOK -

SALT II IN SESSION

EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE ON

*Warren Gussell
Lew Taylor
Bill Leary
Jordan Robbins*

MBFR DUE JANUARY
~~ATTEMPTING~~
WORLD COOLING DOWN — *PERMANENT RELATIONS*

FORCE LEVELS DROPPING -

HOPE ~~MBFR~~ — FURTHER

PEOPLE ASK - WHY NEED MILITARY - POST CONTAINMENT

NEED FOR REAL STRATEGISTS - THINKERS VERY MUCH HERE

~~LOOK WORLD INSIDE U.S.A.~~

*MEANING - COMING
NEW ERA INT REL*

~~CHANGED PERCEPTIONS PRIORITIES~~

~~NEW BUDGET GREATER DOD~~

*FORGE NAVY
IMAGINE TOMORROW*

*PEOPLE FLEX
X CAP UNDERSTAND
NE* ~~NOT BAD~~ — DIFFERENT

ATTITUDE YOUTH DIFFERENT MANY WAYS

YOUTH LIFE BLOOD NAVY

NAVY MAN MUST BE ABLE DEAL NEW ENVIRONMENT AND

ATTITUDES

WHY UNDER Z MOVING TO ADAPT NAVY TO TIMES

CAST THOSE SHACKLES TRADITION NOT ESSENTIAL

DISCIPLINE OR EFFECTIVENESS

MISUNDERSTOOD AS PASSPORT PERMISSIVENESS

ASSURE IT IS NOT

WHAT IS LOOKING AT WHAT YOUTH TODAY IS LIKE

WHAT TAKES TO

ATTRACT

MOTIVATE

RETAIN

PROPORTION

YOUTH ARE IMBUE QUALITIES - CONSIDERATION

IDEALISTIC - PERHAPS BORN OF AFFLUENCE OF SOCIETY

MORE PARTICULAR ABOUT JOBS -

WANT RESPECT - PURPOSE

Z - NEW UNIFORMS

Z - DEMEANING REGULATIONS

SHOW \$ BEFORE LEAVE

Z - PERSONAL CHECK CASHING

INDEPENDENT - INDIVIDUAL

Z - CIVILIAN CLOTHES

Z - HAIR

DEWEY - OTHERS

INTELLIGENT

DISCERN AND RESENT MICKEY MOUSE AND MAKE
WORK

KNOW REAL INTEREST AND ATTENTION FROM
SUPERFICIAL

Z - SPONSORS

Z - MINIMUM WATCHES IN PORT

Z - AIR CHARTER PROGRAM

NOTHING PERMISSIVE IN ALL THIS

RETIRED ADMIRAL

WHERE CLEAN CUT SAILORS

NAVY - LIKE CAR - POWERED BY GAS - YOUNG MEN

CHANGED GAS RECENTLY

ADJUST CARBURETOR

SERIOUS BUSINESS

ALL VOLUNTEER FORCE IN JULY

WON'T HAVE NAVY

NOT CHANGING FOR SAKE CHANGE

CHANGING BECAUSE FORTUNATE HAVE LEADER IN 2 SENSITIVE HUMAN
NEEDS AND TRENDS ^{W/H} AND ~~BECAUSE~~ ADAPTING TO WORLD AROUND US ^{SO}
ESSENTIAL TO OUR FUTURE.

HOW RELATE EDUCATION [?]

ONE HAND HOW DO WE PRODUCE OFFICERS WHO ARE CAPABLE HANDLING VASTLY
MORE COMPLEX PROBLEMS - INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY - OTHER TO
MOTIVATING MODERN YOUTH?

RECOGNIZE INTELLECTUAL CONTENT OR REQUIREMENT IN
NAVY CAREER GREATER TODAY - MAY MEAN CHANGES. HOW

MOST OF A NAVAL OFFICER'S EDUCATIONAL AND PRACTICAL
EXPERIENCE/ INCULCATES IN HIM A VIEW OF A RATIONAL, NEWTONIAN
UNIVERSE. / FOR EVERY CAUSE THERE IS AN EFFECT, / FOR EVERY
QUESTION A RIGHT OR WRONG ANSWER. /

IN HIS VOCATIONAL EXPERIENCE:

AUTHORITARIAN CHAIN OF COMMAND / OBLIGATION OF
RESPONSIBILITY / IS TO HAVE ANSWERS / AND TRAINED TO
MAKE SPECIFIC DECISIONS. /

TECHNICAL ENVIRONMENT - WHERE ANSWERS ARE RIGHT AND WRONG

IN HIS EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCE:

ANNAPOLIS -

ENGINEERING ORIENTED. /

POST GRADUATE -

LARGELY SCIENCES /

FLEET TRAINING -

BRIEFINGS

SKILL PRACTICE

RIGHT-WRONG PROCEDURES

NO COMPLAINT WITH THIS

WE ARE A TECHNICAL SERVICE

TECHNICAL, PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE / IS FOREMOST REQUIREMENT.
OUR EDUCATIONAL AND TRAINING ESTABLISHMENT DOES AN
OUTSTANDING JOB

AS OFFICERS MOVE UP LADDER, HOWEVER, THEY MUST DEAL
INCREASINGLY / WITH SITUATIONS LIKE STRATEGY AND PERSONNEL
MANAGEMENT / THAT ARE NOT SIMPLE OR DIRECT / OR SUSCEPTIBLE
TO PRECISE RIGHT OR WRONG ANSWERS /
MY JOB IS TO FIND HOW EDUCATE PEOPLE / DEAL WITH SUCH ISSUES? /
HOW GET OFFICERS RECOGNIZE SUBLETIES, / UNCERTAINTIES,
INEXACTNESS MUCH DECISION PROCESS? /

NWC - NUMBER WAYS -

~~STRATEGY~~

ATTEMPTING USE HISTORY

DISSECT DECISIONS OF STRATEGISTS OF PAST

HOW DO?

CASE STUDIES

THUYCIDIDES

SEA POWER vs LAND POWER

OVER EXTENDED

NAPOLEONIC WARS

COALITIONS

CIVIL WAR

CIVIL-MILITARY

SPANISH-AMERICAN

IMPERIALISM

NOT THAT HISTORY WILL REPEAT

BUT TODAY'S NAVAL OFFICER MUST COPE THESE PRINCIPLES

IN ANSWERING QUESTIONS LIKE THESE?

WHO ALLIES WILL BE IN NEXT GENERATION?

25 YEARS AGO TWO OF TODAY'S STAUNCHEST ALLIES

WERE PRINCIPAL ENEMIES

WHAT DOES A MULTI-POLAR WORLD MEAN?

WORLD HARDLY EVER BEEN BI-POLAR SINCE CASE

STUDIES 2500 YEARS AGO IN THUYCIDIDES' GREECE

CLEARLY QUESTIONS LIKE NO EASY, PRECISE ANSWERS.
THEREFORE MOST WE CAN GIVE MID-CAREER STUDENTS/EMERGING
INTO LESS PRECISE WORLD OF SOCIAL RATHER PHYSICAL
SCIENCES/ IS EXPERIENCE OF INTENSE THINKING - OF
REASONING, LOGIC AND FAMILIARITY HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE.

HOW? DIG OUT FOR SELVES
ONLY ON CAMPUS FIVE HOURS

*THINKING PROCESS
NOT FACTUAL
ABSORPTION*

TWO LECTURES - ONE SEMINAR

THREE BOOKS - ESSAY

EXPLORE MANY FACETS STRATEGY DECISIONS

BROAD STRATEGY MADE BY USING GOBS OF JUDGMENT MIDST
UNCERTAINTY.

NOT SUGGESTING BROAD STRATEGY MIDST UNCERTAINTY NOT THE ONLY
CONCERN SENIOR OFFICERS

TODAY'S OFFICERS ARE MANAGERS MORE THAN EVER BEFORE

WHAT KIND ISSUES OFFICER FACE AS MANAGERS?

#1 - HOW SPEND SHORTAGE DOLLARS GET MOST DIVIDEND.

DLGN'S \$200M/COPY

FAR SUPERIOR DE'S

- 3-4 TIMES AS COSTLY

NEED PERFORMANCE IN SOME SITUATIONS

NOT IN OTHERS

WHAT MIX?

DIFFICULT TEACH

- NO PRECISE

START BY DETERMINE OBJECTIVES

IMPRECISE - LIKE STRATEGY

HAVING DEFINED OBJECTIVES

MUST MAKE CHOICES - 4 DLGN OR 20 DE

IN DOING ANALYSIS

MORE PRECISE

HAVING CHOSEN MUST EXECUTE

COMBINES STRUCTURED METHODOLOGY OF TECHNOLOGY WITH

THE IMPRECISE APPROACH OF SOCIAL SCIENCE.

FINALLY, ERA DWINDLING FORCES MUST PAY ATTENTION MORE EVER
GETTING MOST FROM WHAT HAVE

THIS THIRD PORTION OF COURSE AT NWC - TACTICS

HERE METHODOLOGY OF TECHNICAL APPROACH PARAMOUNT.

BUT MILITARY OFFICER MUST LEARN TO APPLY IT IN
A NEW WAY

TACTICAL INTERACTIONS ARE THEORETICALLY SUSCEPTIBLE OF
MATHEMATICAL ESTIMATION

RADARS HAVE RANGES, PROBABILITIES OF

DETECTION, ERRORS IN RANGE AND BEARING, ETC.

OF COURSE, THERE ARE ~~TWO~~ PROBLEMS -

1. WE DO NOT YET KNOW HOW TO QUANTIFY SOME OF THE
VALUES IN OUR EQUATIONS:

WEATHER.

HUMAN PERFORMANCE.

ALTHOUGH THOUGHT PROCESS IS SYSTEMATIC.

DECISION MAKER MAY HAVE TO

INSERT HIS OWN GUESS AS TO THE MISSING QUANTITIES -

IN SHORT IN THE REALM OF TACTICS, MANY SOLUTIONS ARE NOT RIGHT
AND WRONG ANSWERS BUT PROBABILITIES. IT IS SELDOM SO CLEAR
AS TO BE A GO OR NO GO SITUATION. THERE IS SIMPLY A GREATER
OR LESSER PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS.

SENIOR MILITARY OFFICER MUST LEARN DEAL PRECISENESS
HIS TECHNICAL APPROACH DIFFERENT MANNER.

THE PROSPECT OF HAVING TO DEVELOP LEADERS/*WFO*
THINK TERMS/UNCERTAINTY BROAD STRATEGY,/ COMBINATION PRECISE
MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS) AND JUDGEMENT ON OBJECTIVES AND EXECUTION
AND THE PROBABILITIES OF TACTICS MEANS SEVERAL THINGS TO YOUR
NAVY TODAY

1. WHILE MUST STILL PRODUCE MEN TECHNICALLY COMPETENT
MUST ALSO ACCENT THE THINKING, REASONING AND ANALYTIC
PROCESS IN OUR OFFICER EDUCATION - WHAT ATTEMPTING DO NWC

2. RECRUITING

MUST GET REASONABLE SHARE BRIGHTER YOUNG PEOPLE
VOLUNTEER FORCE
NEED YOUR HELP - BY ENSURING YOUTH GROW UP
UNDERSTANDING PROFESSION HONORABLE

GETTING HELP FACT THE ADDITION OF A GREATER INTELLECTUAL
CHALLENGE TO TRADITIONAL APPEALS OF A MILITARY CAREER, TODAY
MAKE THAT CAREER MORE EXCITING THAN EVER

GOING TO BE MUCH LESS MARCHING IN STEP TO A PRE-
PLANNED BATTLE DOCTRINE - MUCH GREATER SCOPE FOR
INDIVIDUAL THINKING AND INITIATIVE

YOUNG MEN WILL SEE/THAT OUR NATIONAL SECURITY WILL
DEPEND MORE THAN EVER/ON THE INTELLECTUAL FIBER OF OUR
MILITARY LEADERS/ NOT JUST SO IF GET INTO ANOTHER WAR

EVEN ~~THOUGH~~ ALL HOPEFUL BE ABLE AVOID ACTUAL MILITARY
CONFLICTS ^{BUT} ABILITY DO SO WILL DEPEND WHETHER SMART
ENOUGH TO STAY ABREAST OF ENEMY TECHNOLOGY AND TACTICS
IF ^{WE} NOT WILL NOT DETER BECAUSE THE ENEMY WILL RECOGNIZE
US AS A PAPER TIGER THEREFORE WHETHER WE WILL BE
FORCED INTO EMPLOYING MILITARY ^{POWER} FORCE OR NOT IS LIKELY
TO BE IN PART ^{LARGE} OF A PRODUCT OF THE INTELLECTUAL CAPABILITY
THAT YOUR ARMED FORCES POSSESS.

I AM EXCITED AT BEING IN TODAY'S NAVY -- IT IS STIMULATING
AND CHALLENGING -- I SEE TOMORROW'S NAVY AS EVEN MORE SO.
WITH SUPPORT OF CITIZENS LIKE YOU I AM CONFIDENT THAT WE
WILL FIND WITHIN TODAY'S YOUTH THE INTELLECTUAL LEADERSHIP
THAT WILL KEEP OUR NAVY AND OUR NATION STRONG AND SAFE.